Labour demand and job-to-job movement by Hassink, W.H.J. & Broersma, L.
Applied Economics, 1996, 28, 957 Ð 965
Labour demand and job-to-job movement
WOLTER HASSINK* and LOURENS BROERSMA §
*Department of Economics, V rije Universiteit Amsterdam/T inbergen Institute and
§Department of Economics, V rije Universiteit Amsterdam
The relationship between labour demand and job-to-job movement is investigated,
both theoretically and empirically, at the macro level. It concentrates on the role of the
employment regime (hiring, do-nothing or ® ring) and the hiring and ® ring costs. The
exact upper bounds of the marginal hiring costs of an employed worker are derived,
for which job mobility between two ® rms yields a positive aggregate relationship
between job-to-job movement and employment. The relationship is estimated as
a cointegration model for the Netherlands; it appears that the inclusion of the
job-to-job mobility rate may provide a substantial improvement of the estimated
labour-demand equation.
I . INTRODUCTION
Although job-to-job mobility may facilitate employment
adjustment, the impact of job-to-job movement has
never been fully implemented into labour-demand models.
In this paper, job-to-job mobility is a worker’s change
of jobs between di erent ® rms. In labour-demand literature
the out¯ ow part of job-to-job movement, voluntary quits,
is captured, mainly in theoretical studies (Nickell, 1986
and Bertola, 1992), but recently also in some empirical
studies (Burgess, 1993, Hamermesh, 1995, and Hamermesh
and Pfann, 1996). For the in¯ ow part of job-to-job move-
ment a distinction between di erent sources of applicants is
necessary, but so far this topic has not been discussed in
labour-demand studies.
The purpose of this paper is to derive the condi-
tions under which job-to-job movement has a positive
impact on the level of employment, and to estimate the
relationship. Job-to-job mobility is a very complex
phenomenon because it involves matches of heterogeneous
workers with heterogeneous ® rms. Our paper concentrates
on the role of the employment regime (hiring, do-nothing
or ® ring) and the hiring and ® ring costs. Our model is
very simpli® ed: ® rms have equal technologies, although they
may be in di erent employment regimes (® ring, do-nothing
or hiring) and they have di erent hiring costs. Quits of
workers to other ® rms are considered as an exogenous
process. We do not consider the impact of e cient wages
(Stiglitz, 1986).
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II provides
the theoretical micro-model; Section III considers its
macro-implications; Section IV discusses some tentative
estimation results; Section V concludes.
II . THEORY
This section constructs a micro-framework describing the
relationship between employment and job-to-job mobility.
To determine the optimal employment path, ® rm i maxi-
mizes the expected discounted future pro® ts
max
{L i , t+ s}
Et
`
+
s= 0
/ s 3 P (L i , t+ s , Z1 , i , t+ s , Z2 , i , t+ s , ¼ , ZR, i , t+ s)
- wi , t+ sL i , t+ s -
R
+
r= 1
pr, iZr, i , t - 0.5Ci , t+ s4
i = 1, ¼ , N (1)
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on the
information available at time t, / is discount factor, P is
a concave production function, L is the level of employment,
which is homogeneous inside a ® rm, Z are other production
factors, w is the real wage, pr is the real price of the rth
production factor, R + 1 is the number of production fac-
tors, N the number of ® rms, and C is an adjustment cost
function.
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Following Hamermesh (1995), our functional form of the
production function is
P (L i , t , Z1 , i , t , Z2 , i , t , ¼ , ZR, i , t)
= (j ` 0 + j 0 , t)L i , t +
R
+
r= 1
(j ` r + j r, t)Zr, i , t - 0.5 c 0 L
2
i , t
- 0.5
R
+
r= 1
c rZ
2
r, i , t +
R
+
r= 1
z rL i , tZr, i , t ,
i = 1, ¼ , N (2)
where j ` , z and c are positive parameters of the production
function; j is a serially uncorrelated error process, with zero
mean and ® nite variance.
The adjustment costs C are split into net and gross
adjustment costs, because Hamermesh (1995) demonstrates
empirically that both sources of turnover costs are present.
Net adjustment costs are the costs of a change of the
long-run levels of employment. Gross adjustment costs are
the costs of the total in¯ ow of workers, which are, for
instance, the costs of selection and training, or the costs of
the total out¯ ow of workers, which are the costs of ® ring.
We distinguish between the hiring of previously unem-
ployed and employed workers, having marginal gross ad-
justment costs 2n 1 , iF
iu and 2n 2Fiq, respectively. The former
are heterogeneous across ® rms. The di erence is caused by
heterogeneous training costs, but we assume that after train-
ing the workers inside the ® rm are homogeneous.
The model is based on three additional simplifying as-
sumptions. The ® rst simplifying assumption is that there are
di erent employment regimes: a h`iring regime’ in which the
® rm only hires; a d`o-nothing regime’, in which the ® rm
neither hires nor ® res; and a ®` ring regime’, in which the ® rm
only ® res. This framework implies that a ® rm does not hire
and ® re simultaneously. Note that this framework is only
suitable for labour that is homogeneous inside ® rms. Obvi-
ously, this is not very realistic. Hamermesh et al. (1996)
demonstrated that due to heterogeneous labour a lot of
® rms hire and ® re simultaneously. The second assumption is
that both the type of applicants and the quit decision of the
worker are exogenous for a ® rm. The third assumption is
that we assume that a ® rm does not form a pool of appli-
cants, but hires the ® rst suitable applicant, whether pre-
viously employed or unemployed. Hence, it is possible that
a ® rm hires previously unemployed and employed workers
within the same period.
The adjustment cost functions of ® rm i for the three
regimes are, respectively,
Ci , t = n 0 (L i , t - L i , t ± 1 )
2 + n 1 , i (Fiui , t)
2 + n 2 (Fiqi , t)
2
if L i , t = L i , t ± 1 + F
iq
i , t + F iui , t - F
xq
i , t (3a)
Ci , t = n 0 (L i , t - L i , t ± 1 )
2 if L i , t = L i , t ± 1 - Fxqi , t (3b)
Ci , t = n 0 (L i , t - L i , t ± 1 )
2 + n 3 (F xui , t)
2
if L i , t = L i , t ± 1 - Fxui , t - F
xq
i , t (3c)
F represents various workers ¯ ows; the superscripts iq and
iu denote the in¯ ow of employed and unemployed workers,
respectively; the superscripts xq and xu denote the out¯ ow
of a worker to another job or into unemployment, respec-
tively; n 0 , n 1 , i , n 2 and n 3 are positive parameters.
The marginal gross ® ring costs are 2 n 3Fxu. In a ® ring
regime no gross adjustment costs are connected to a volunt-
ary out¯ ow F xq, since, with homogeneous labour, quits
contribute to the reduction of employment, which a ® rm in
a ® ring regime wants to attain. In a ® ring regime the number
of quits may be larger than the planned decrease of the
level of employment, which leads, consequently, to hiring of
workers. We abstract from this case, because it does not
provide additional knowledge about job mobility. Net
adjustment costs are the same for all regimes. However,
Equation 3 re¯ ects an asymmetric relationship between
quits and adjustment costs. In a hiring regime a voluntary
out¯ ow of workers may increase the adjustment costs. On
the other hand, in a ® ring regime such an out¯ ow of workers
decreases the adjustment costs, as can readily be observed
from Equation 3c.
Appendix A derives the labour demand equations for the
three regimes. The labour demand equation for a ® rm in
a hiring regime is
L i , t = a iL i , t ± 1 + (h i n 1 , i - h i n 2 )F iqi , t - h i n 1 , iFxqi , t
+
R
+
r= 0
g r, iZr, i , t ,
F iqi , t + F iui , t > 0 (4a)
where a and g are parameters, and w º Z0 . The parameter
h i is equal to
a i (1 - r iq/ b i)
± 1 (/ r iq - 1)/( n 0 + n 1 , i)
where r iq is the AR-parameter of the AR(1)-process, that we
assume to generate voluntary quits; a i and b i are the
smallest and the largest root of the second order di erence
equation in L i , t (Appendix A); (1 - a i) is called the speed of
adjustment of employment. Conditional on the in¯ ow
of a previously unemployed worker, the negative impact of
voluntary quits on employment equals h i n 1 , iF
xq. If also
employed workers have been hired, the impact of the in¯ ow
of employed workers on L is (h i n 1 , i - h i n 2 )Fiq. Equation 4a
shows that if the hiring costs of a previous employed worker
are lower (higher) than the hiring costs of a previously
unemployed worker, the in¯ ow of previously employed
workers has a positive (negative) impact on employment.
In the same way, it is possible to derive the labour
demand equations for a ® rm in a do-nothing regime and
a ® ring regime. These are, respectively,
L i , t = a 0 L i , t ± 1 +
R
+
r= 0
g rZr, i , t
(4b)
L i , t = L i , t ± 1 - F xqi , t
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and
L i , t = a iL i , t ± 1 - h i n 3 Fxqi , t +
R
+
r= 0
g r, iZr, i , t
(4c)
Fxui , t > 0
Equation 4c shows that in a ® ring regime, higher ® ring
costs, n 3 , lead to a more negative impact of quits on employ-
ment. Thus, if ® ring costs are low, quits have less impact on
employment than if ® ring costs are high. In the extreme case
of absence of ® ring costs ( n 3 = 0), a quit has no impact on
employment, since the ® rm faces two options to reduce
employment, voluntary quits or ® ring, which both have no
gross adjustment costs.
III . MACRO IMPLICATIONS
This section considers the implications of the micro-equa-
tions for labour demand at the macro-level. To keep things
simple, we ® rst discuss two cases in which one worker
moves from one ® rm to another. In both cases, the worker
moves to a ® rm in a hiring regime. The ® rm from which the
worker quits is, in the ® rst case, also in a hiring regime,
but in the second case it is in a ® ring regime. Next, we
construct the aggregate equation for all ® rms. We do not
explicitly discuss job-to-job movement from a ® rm in a do-
nothing regime, since, if we take n 3 = 0, then a voluntary
quit from a ® ring ® rm and a do-nothing ® rm have the same
implications.
L abour mobility from a hiring Þ rm to another hiring Þ rm
Suppose that both ® rm i and ® rm j want to hire one
extra worker. We ® rst investigate for which values of
n 1 , i , n 1 , j and n 2 , the marginal gross adjustment costs in
the case of absence of a quit between ® rm i and j are larger
than the marginal gross adjustment costs in the case of
a quit between ® rm i and j. Only then, can job-to-
job movement have a positive impact on the level of
employment. Next, we compare this outcome with the coef-
® cient of job-to-job movement in the aggregate employment
equation.
If there is no movement of a worker between ® rm i and j,
then both ® rms hire an unemployed worker. According to
Equation 3a, the marginal gross adjustment costs without
a quit are 2 n 1 , i + 2 n 1 , j . In the case of a job switch from ® rm
j to ® rm i, ® rm i hires the employed worker from ® rm j, and
® rm j hires two unemployed workers, since both ® rms want
to expand employment with one person each. The marginal
gross adjustment costs become 2 n 2 + 4 n 1 , j . Job-to-job
movement has a positive impact on employment only if the
marginal gross adjustment costs, in the case of absence of
job mobility between both ® rms, are larger than the mar-
ginal gross adjustment costs in the case of a worker moving
between both ® rms. Hence,
2 n 1 , i + 2n 1 , j > 2 n 2 + 4 n 1 , j
or,
n 1 , i - n 1 , j > n 2 (5)
Thus, job-to-job mobility will increase employment at
the aggregate level if the marginal gross adjustment costs of
hiring an unemployed worker are much lower (at least n 2 )
for ® rm j than for ® rm i. Note that if both ® rm i and
® rm j have the same marginal gross adjustment costs of
hiring an unemployed, then the LHS of Equation 5 is zero.
In that case both ® rms lose when a worker moves from one
® rm to the other, because in total it leads to higher marginal
gross adjustment costs. This is the case, even if the marginal
gross adjustment costs of a quit (2 n 2 ) are relatively
low.
We compare Equation 5 with the coe cient of job-to-job
mobility in an aggregate labour-demand equation. Concen-
trating on the in¯ ow and out¯ ow of workers, the labour-
demand equations of ® rm i and j are, essentially,
L i , t = h i n 1 , iF iqi , t - h i n 2 F iqi , t - h i n 1 , iFxqi , t + ¼ (6a)
L j , t = h j n 1 , jF iqj , t - h j n 2 F iqj , t - h j n 1 , jFxqj , t + ¼ (6b)
where the dots represent the other explanatory variables
which have been omitted for convenience. Suppose there is
one quit from ® rm j to ® rm i, hence F iqi , t = Fxqj , t = 1 and
F xqi , t = F iqj , t = 0. The aggregate labour-demand equation of
both ® rms becomes
L t = (h i n 1 , i - h i n 2 - h j n 1 , j )JJt + ¼ , (7)
where job-to-job movement JJ = F iqt = Fxqt . Quits have
a positive impact on the level of employment if the coe -
cient of job-to-job mobility is positive, or
n 1 , i - (h j/h i) n 1 , j > n 2 (8)
This is almost equal to Equation 5, except for a scaling
factor h j/h i. According to Appendix A,
h j /h i = [(n 0 + n 1 , i)/( n 0 + n 1 , j )][(b i - r iq)/( b j - r iq)]
3 [(a j b j/a i b i)]
» (a j n 1 , i)/(a i n 1 , j ) > 1, if n 1 , j < n 1 , i
< 1, if n 1 , j > n 1 , i (9)
Recall that (1 - a i) is the speed of adjustment of em-
ployment of ® rm i. From Equations A3 and A4 in
Appendix A one can derive that n 1 , j < n 1 , i implies a j > a i .
This is also intuitively clear, since larger gross adjustment
costs of the in¯ ow of unemployed workers leads to a slower
speed of adjustment of employment. h i is determined by
/ , c 0 , n 0 and n 1 , i ; the exact relationship is very complex. We
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have simulated h j/h i for di erent values n 1 , i and n 1 , j , using
several realistic values of / , c 0 and n 0 , based on estimates of
Sargent (1978) and Meese (1980). It appears that ratio h j/h i
is slightly larger than one, and varies only moderately.
Simulation results are available from the authors upon
request.
Equations 6a, b also imply that if ® rm i and j hire one
worker from each other, the coe cient of JJ becomes
- (h i + h j ) n 2 . Hence, job-to-job mobility has a negative
impact on aggregate employment, if two ® rms exchange
a worker.
L abour mobility from a Þ ring Þ rm to a hiring Þ rm
The second case concerns job-to-job mobility from a ® rm
in a ® ring regime to a ® rm in a hiring regime. Again, we
® rst investigate the e ect of job-to-job mobility on the
gross adjustment costs for both ® rms. Recall that a reduc-
tion of gross adjustment costs of employment has a negative
impact on employment for the ® ring ® rm, but a positive
impact on employment for the hiring ® rm. Therefore,
in order to obtain a positive relationship between aggregate
employment and aggregate quits, the ® rm in the hiring
regime should have relatively low gross adjustment costs,
whereas the ® rm in the ® ring regime should have high
gross adjustment costs. Hence, in this case, we may not
compare the situation without quits with the situation with
quits, such as in Equation 5. Instead, we compare the
reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the
® ring ® rm due to a quit instead of ® ring a worker, with the
reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the
hiring ® rm, due to hiring an employed worker instead of an
unemployed. If the former is smaller than the latter, job-to-
job mobility has a positive impact on the aggregate level of
employment.
Suppose ® rm i hires an unemployed worker, with mar-
ginal gross adjustment costs 2 n 1 , i , and ® rm j ® res an em-
ployed worker, with marginal gross adjustment costs 2n 3 .
Quits have a positive impact on employment for both ® rms
taken together, only if the decrease of the marginal gross
adjustment costs of the hiring ® rm (2 n 1 , i - 2 n 2 ) is larger
than the decrease of the marginal gross adjustment costs,
(2 n 3 - 0) (no costs are connected with a quit), of the ® ring
® rm:
n 1 , i - n 2 > n 3 (10)
Next, we compare this result with the coe cient of job-to-
job mobility in the aggregate labour-demand equation
of both ® rms. The labour-demand equation of ® rms i
and j are
L i , t = h i n 1 , iF iqi , t - h i n 2 F iqi , t - h i n 1 , iF xqi , t + ¼ (11a)
L j , t = - h j n 3 Fxqj , t + ¼ (11b)
Since, F iqi , t = Fxqj , t = 1 and Fxqi , t = 0, the aggregate equation of
both ® rms becomes
L t = (h i n 1 , i - h i n 2 - h j n 3 )JJt + ¼ (12)
Job-to-job mobility has a positive impact on employment at
the aggregate level, if
n 1 , i - n 2 > (h j/h i) n 3
Simulations have shown that h j/h i is about equal to one.
The aggregate equation
The two previous sub-sections have demonstrated under
which restrictions a quit between two ® rms leads to a posi-
tive impact on the level of employment. Job-to-job move-
ment can be considered as an allocation process, which
changes the adjustment costs overall. It is possible that
job-to-job mobility between two ® rms is not an optimal
allocation process, for instance, if n 1 , i and n 1 , j do not di er
su ciently for two ® rms in a hiring regime, and yet an
employee changes jobs. The labour-demand equation at the
macro level becomes
L t = l L t ± 1 +
R
+
r= 0
g rZr, t , + g R+ 1 JJt (13)
where the coe cients are weighted sums of the coe cients
of the individual labour-demand equations. The sign of
g R+ 1 is indeterminate.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents the estimation and test results of
Equation 13. Ideally, one should use a data set of ® rms
containing information on the hiring costs from di erent
sources of workers. Because we have no access to such
a data set, we use quarterly manufacturing data for the
Netherlands as a ® rst step. We take as explanatory variables
in the vector Z: the real wage (w), the real capital stock (K),
measures of competitiveness (COMP), world trade shocks
(W T ) and adjusted ® scal stance (AD) and an index of
technical progress (TP). Appendix B provides a description
of these variables.
Notice that the aggregate labour-demand Equation 13 is
based on aggregation across ® rms with heterogeneous, ® rm-
speci® c labour, with di erent responses. Therefore, we spec-
ify a functional form with additional lags on all variables in
Equation 13 (cf. Nickell, 1986). Application of the aug-
mented Dickey Ð Fuller unit root test indicates that the pres-
ence of a unit root in all variables involved, with a
possible exception of WT, cannot be denied. Hence, if the
error process is stationary, we can rewrite Equation 13 in
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Table 1. Estimation results
Dependent variable: D 1 logL t Sample period: 1972:2Ð 1990:4
Independent variables
CONST - 0.0030 ( - 3.686)*
log(L /K) t ± 1 - 0.0049 ( - 4.435)*
log(wt ± 1 ) - 0.0016 ( - 2.426)*
JJt ± 1 0.0011 (4.368)*
D 1 log L t ± 1 1.1466 (39.92)*
D 1 log L t ± 4 - 0.2896 ( - 8.220)*
D 4 log(Kt ± 1 ) - 0.0186 ( - 4.959)*
D 1 log(wt ± 1 ) - 0.0174 ( - 2.653)*
D 1COMPt ± 1 0.0038 (2.155)*
D 1W T t ± 1 0.0181 (4.654)*
S.E. 0.000751
R2 0.986
T 75
x 2norm(2) 2.163
FAR(1, 61) 0.426
FAR(5, 57) 0.135
LB (12) 14.02
FARCH (1,74) 0.947
FARCH (5,70) 0.738
FRESET (1,61) 0.840
FRESET (3,59) 1.481
FChow (16,46) 0.986
FChow (8,54) 0.690
FX i2 (22,53) 1.503
* Statistically signi® cant from zero at the 5% level.
Seasonal dummies are not presented. The t-values are in brackets
by the estimated parameter values, S.E. is the residual standard
error of the equation, R2 is the correlation coe cient and T is the
number of observations used to estimate and test the model,
x 2norm is the normality test of Jarque and Bera. FAR is Godfrey’s test
on residual autocorrelation. LB is the LjungÐ Box test on residual
autocorrelation. FARCH is Engle’s ARCH test on heteroskedasticity.
FRESET is the RESET test. FChow is the Chow test on predictive
failure and FX i2 is White’s test on heteroskedasticity, based on
actual and squared regressors. The numbers in brackets by the test
statistics represent the corresponding degrees of freedom.
error-correction form
D 1 log (L t) = m + l 1 (log(L t ± 1 ) +
R
+
r= 0
g rlog(Zr, t ± 1 )
+ g R+ 1JJt ± 1 ) +
p
+
s= 1
t s D 1 log(L t ± s)
+
R
+
r= 0
q
+
s= 1
t r, s D 1 log(Zr, t ± s)
+
q
+
s= 1
t R+ 1 , s D 1JJt ± s + e t (14)
where m is the deterministic part of the equation, consisting
of a constant and seasonal dummy variables, D is the di er-
ence operator D kX º Xt - Xt ± k and e t is an uncorrelated
white-noise error process. All explanatory variables in
Equation 14 are lagged in order to evade simultaneity bias
of the estimates of the parameters.
Our approach to model speci® cation is to move from
general to speci® c. Also the standard battery of misspeci® ca-
tion tests will be applied in order to assess the statistical
validity of the model involved. As tests on cointegration we
apply the Wald test developed by Boswijk (1992) and the
standard tests of Engle and Granger (1987). Both indicate
that cointegration, as assumed to be present in Equation 14,
cannot be rejected. Results of unit root, simpli® cation and
cointegration tests can be obtained from the authors on
request. The simpli® ed model that is ® nally selected, is
presented in Table 1.
This model has the following implications. First, the
short-run demand elasticity including scale e ects, based
on Hamermesh (1993), which can be obtained from the
error-correction part of the model, is - 0.32. This is very
much in line with the survey of empirical studies from
Hamermesh (1993) who argues that the elasticity should
be about - 0.30. The coe cients of D 1COMPt ± 1 and
D 1W T t ± 1 have the expected sign. The negative sign of the
capital stock variable implies substitution between labour
and capital. The coe cient of the JJt ± 1 is positive, implying
that an increase in the job-to-job mobility rate contributes
to expanding employment. The elasticity with respect to
job-to-job movement is about 0.23.
In Equations 4a and 4c, we introduced the possibility of
a di erent e ect of quits on employment, depending on the
assumption of whether the ® rm is in a hiring regime or in
a ® ring regime. However, the estimates of Table 1 imply
a constant impact. We next try to relax this assumption by
weighting the quits over the number of ® rms in a hiring and
a ® ring regime. The weights applied are based on the ¯ ow of
persons into and out of employment. Out¯ ow Fx equals the
total number of persons moving from employment into
unemployment and non-participation in the Netherlands.
Then in¯ ow Fi is de® ned as F it = D 1 L tott + Fxt , where L tot is
the total number of workers in the Netherlands. Total
mobility from ® rms in a ® ring regime to ® rms in a hiring
regime is approximated by
JJft = JJ*t Fxt /(Fxt + Fit)
then mobility from ® rms in a hiring regime to other ® rms in
a hiring regime is
JJht = JJ*t Fit/(F xt + Fit )
This approach yields the model presented in Table 2. Like
the model in Table 1, none of the diagnostic tests seem to
indicate that it is severely misspeci® ed.
The estimation results of this extended model show that
the coe cients of the explanatory variables are of a similar
magnitude as those of the model in the Table 1. In this case,
we ® nd a wage elasticity with scale e ect of - 0.27. The
distinction we make between quits in a hiring and in a ® ring
regime, seems to suggest that only quits in a ® ring regime
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Table 2. Estimation results
Dependent variable: D 1 log L t Sample period: 1972:2Ð 1990:4
Independent
variables
CONST - 0.0028 ( - 3.430)* - 0.0029 ( - 3.899)*
log(L /K)t ± 1 - 0.0046 ( - 4.106)* - 0.0047 ( - 4.550)*
log(wt ± 1 ) - 0.0012 ( - 1.759)* - 0.0013 ( - 1.957)*
JJht ± 1 - 0.0002 ( - 0.243)
JJft ± 1 0.0026 (2.547)* 0.0024 (4.685)*
D 1 logL t ± 1 1.1744 (34.50)* 1.1698 (41.90)*
D 1 logL t ± 4 - 0.2911 ( - 8.342)* - 0.2920 ( - 8.474)*
D 4 log(Kt ± 1 ) - 0.0184 ( - 4.928)* - 0.0185 ( - 5.092)*
D 1 log(wt ± 1 ) - 0.0202 ( - 2.988)* - 0.0197 ( - 3.057)*
D 1COMPt ± 1 0.0038 (2.150)* 0.0038 (2.170)*
D 1W T t ± 1 0.0188 (4.106)* 0.0187 (4.883)*
S.E. 0.000744 0.000739
R2 0.986 0.986
T 75 75
x 2norm(2) 2.879 2.656
FAR(1, 61) 0.221 0.226
FAR(5, 57) 0.169 0.163
LB(12) 14.84 14.76
FARCH (1,74) 0.470 0.558
FARCH (5,70) 0.259 0.318
FRESET (1,61) 0.829 0.824
FRESET (3,59) 1.552 0.975
FChow (16,45) 0.950 0.807
FChow (8,53) 0.888 0.753
FX i2 (22,53) 1.429 1.414
* Statistically signi® cant from zero at the 5% level.
Statistical parameters as Table 1.
have a positive and signi® cant impact on employment,
whereas the in¯ uence of quits in a hiring regime appears to
be negative and insigni® cantly di erent from zero. Hence,
the e ect of job-to-job mobility on employment is larger in
case a majority of ® rms is in a ® ring regime. The elasticity
with respect to JJf equals 0.51.
Turning back to the theory of Sections II and III, we can
draw the following tentative conclusions from our empirical
results. First, job-to-job mobility appears to have a signi® -
cant positive impact on employment. Second, in distinguish-
ing hiring and ® ring regimes, it appears that the impact of
job-to-job mobility on employment is signi® cantly di erent
between those regimes. This suggests that there is consider-
able heterogeneity between ® rms, which is also implied by
our theory. Job mobility from a ® rm in a ® ring regime to
a hiring ® rm appears to have a particularly strong, positive
e ect on employment. According to Equation 12 the posi-
tive sign of JJf indicates that the bene® ts for the ® rm with
increasing employment, i.e. hiring an employed worker in-
stead of an unemployed, are larger than the bene® ts for the
® rm with decreasing employment, i.e. not having to ® re the
worker. This might indicate that for a lot of ® rms the hiring
costs of employed workers are smaller than the hiring costs
of unemployed workers, which is in accordance with Blau
and Robins (1990) and Lindeboom et al. (1993). In the case
of job mobility from a ® rm in a hiring regime to a hiring
® rm, JJh has a negative yet insigni® cant e ect on employ-
ment. Equation 7 shows that the non-positive sign of JJh
implies a weak heterogeneity concerning in¯ ow costs of
unemployed workers across ® rms. In that case job mobility
between two ® rms in a hiring regime is not bene® cial for
both ® rms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have demonstrated theoretically under
which conditions labour mobility between two ® rms has
a positive impact on the aggregate level of employment. We
have derived the upper bound of the marginal hiring costs of
an employed worker, for which job-to-job movement has
a positive impact on aggregate employment. We have dis-
tinguished two cases. In the ® rst case, a worker moves from
a ® rm in a hiring regime to another ® rm in a hiring regime.
Job-to-job movement increases the gross adjustment costs
of the ® rm from which the employee leaves, but may reduce
the in¯ ow costs for the ® rm to which the employee moves.
We have demonstrated that for those pairs of ® rms, job-to-
job mobility has a positive impact on aggregate employ-
ment if the di¤ erence in marginal adjustment costs of hiring
an unemployed worker between both ® rms is larger than the
marginal hiring costs of an employed worker. In the second
case, a worker moves from a ® rm in a ® ring regime to a ® rm
in a hiring regime. This movement leads to a reduction of
gross adjustment costs for both ® rms. In this case, job-to-
job movement has a positive impact on employment if the
reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the ® rm
in the hiring regime is larger than the reduction for the ® rm
in the ® ring regime. We conclude that it is not possible to
establish the sign of job-to-job movement in the aggregate
employment equation a priori, unless the size of the in¯ ow
costs of employed and unemployed workers of both ® rms is
known. This is in line with Caballero (1992), who argues
that aggregation may lead to indeterminate relationships.
The heterogeneity of the in¯ ow costs of unemployed
workers over ® rms is an important element of the theore-
tical framework. Therefore, the relationship between quits
and employment should ideally be tested with micro-data,
containing at least information on the source and the costs
of the in¯ ow of workers. We have estimated the relation-
ship with macro-data for the Netherlands. It appears that
job-to-job mobility has a substantial positive impact on
employment, implying that job mobility is bene® cial for the
demand for labour. From a policy point of view it indicates
that to stimulate employment growth it is important to
promote job mobility of workers. For instance the govern-
ment should ensure that a job change does not reduce the
pension claim of a worker (this still may happen in the
Netherlands). Basically, this is in accordance with measures
to stimulate a more ¯ exible labour market.
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In our empirical model we have made an e ort to distin-
guish quits from ® rms in a ® ring regime to ® rms in a hiring
regime, and quits from ® rms in a hiring regime to other
® rms in a hiring regime. The former variable has a positive
coe cient, indicating that the reduction in training costs for
the hiring ® rm is larger than the reduction in ® ring costs for
the ® rm with decreasing employment. This estimate indi-
cates that the hiring costs of an unemployed may be larger
than the hiring costs of an employed worker. The latter
variable has a insigni® cant, negative, coe cient, which leads
to the conclusion that the heterogeneity in in¯ ow costs of
unemployed workers is not so large that job mobility be-
tween two hiring ® rms facilitates aggregate employment
adjustment.
APPENDIX A. MICRO LABOUR-DEMAND
EQUATIONS
For its employment decision, the maximization problem of
® rm i in a hiring regime is
max
{L i , t+ s}
Et
`
+
s= 0
/ s{P (L i , t+ s , Z1 i , t+ s , Z2 , i , t+ s , ¼ , ZR, i , t+ s )
- wi , t+ sL i , t+ s -
R
+
r= 1
pr, iZr, i , t+ s
- 0.5 [n 0 (L i , t+ s - L i , t+ s ± 1 )
2 + n 1 i (F i0i , t+ s)
2
+ n 2 (Fiqi , t+ s )
2]} (A1)
Using the de® nition of P in Equation 2, this is equal to
max
{L i , t+ s}
Et
`
+
s= 0
/ s{(j ` 0 + j 0 , t+ s)L i , t+ s +
R
+
r= 1
(j ` r + j r, t+ s)Zr, i , t+ s
- 0.5 c 0 L 2i , t+ s - 0.5
R
+
r= 1
c rZ
2
r, i , t+ s
+
R
+
r= 1
z rL i , t+ sZr, i , t+ s - wi , t+ sL i , t+ s -
R
+
r= 1
pr, iZr, i , t+ s
- 0.5[n 0 (L i , t+ s - L i , t+ s ± 1 )
2 + n 1 , i (L i , t+ s - L i , t+ s ± 1
- F iqi , t+ s + Fxqi , t+ s )
2 + n 2 (F iqi , t+ s)
2]} (A2)
The Euler equation of Equation A2 is
/ Et+ sL i , t+ s+ 1 - [ c 0 /( n 0 + n 1 , i) + 1 + / ]L i , t+ s + L i , t+ s ± 1
= (n 0 + n 1 , i)
± 1 [ - (j ` 0 + j 0 , t+ s) + wi , t+ s -
R
+
r= 1
z rZr, i , t+ s
+ (n 1 , i - n 2 )( / Et+ sF iqi , t+ s+ 1 - F iqi , t+ s)
- n 1 , i ( / Et+ sFxqi , t+ s+ 1 - Fxqi , t+ s )]
s = 0, 1, 2, ¼ (A3)
where the transversality condition is
lim
s ® `
/ sEtL t+ s = 0
We follow Sargent (1978) and Hamermesh (1995) by model-
ling forward-looking expectations. The solutions of the
Euler equation, after factorisation, is
L i , t = a iL i , t ± 1 - a i/( n 0 + n 1 , i)
`
+
s= 0
b i
± s[ - (j , 0 + j 0 , t+ s)
+ wi , t+ s -
R
+
r= 1
z rZr, i , t+ s
+ (n 1 , i - n 2 ) (/ Et+ sF iqi , t+ s+ 1 - F iqi , t+ s)
- n 1 , i ( / Et+ sFxqi , t+ s+ 1 - Fxqi , t+ s)] (A4)
where 0< a i < 1< /
± 1 < b i . Note that the roots of the
second-order di erence Equation A3, a i and b i are nonlinear
functions of / , c 0 , n 0 and n 1 , i. We assume j 0 , i , t ,F
xq
i , t , F
iq
i , t , wi , t
and Zr, i , t , r = 1, ¼ , R, to follow an AR(1)-process, with AR
parameters r
j
, r xq , r iq , r w and r Z, r , r = 1, ¼ , R, respec-
tively (cf. Sargent, 1978 and Hamermesh, 1995). The labour-
demand equation becomes
L i , t = a iL i , t ± 1 - a i/( n 0 + n 1 , i)[ - j ` 0 (1 - 1/b i)
± 1
- j 0 , t(1 - r j / b i)
± 1 + wi , t(1 - r w/b i)
± 1
-
R
+
r= 1
z rZi , r (1 - r Z, r/ b i)
± 1
+ ( n 1 , i - n 2 ) (1 - r iq/ b i)
± 1 (/ r iq - 1)F iqi , t
- n 1 , i(1 - r xq/ b i)
± 1 (/ r xq - 1)Fxqi , t] (A5)
We de® ne w º Z0 , and suppose r iq » r xq . Equation A5
becomes in obvious notation
L i , t = a iL i , t ± 1 + h i n 1 , iF iqi , t - h i n 2 F iqi , t - h i n 1 , iFxqi , t
+
R
+
r= 1
g r, iZr, i , t ,
F iqi , t + Fiui , t > 0 (A6)
where h i = a i(1 - r iq/ b i)
± 1 (/ r iq - 1)/( n 0 + n 1 , i).
In the same way, the labour demand in the do-nothing
regime and the ® ring regime can be derived.
APPENDIX B. DATA SOURCES ,
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations
CBS Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics
CPB Netherlands Central Planning Bureau
OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development
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UN United Nations
MEI Main Economic Indicators
MBS Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
NA National Accounts
All variables are based on those used by Layard and Nickell
(1986) and Burgess (1993). Interpolation is done by means
of a third order polynomial function, unless mentioned
otherwise.
L : Paid employment in the manufacturing sector in
thousand man years, interpolated. Burgess (1993)
takes the actual number of employed as a measure
of labour demand. Unfortunately, for the Nether-
lands this series is only available from 1978 on.
Because we study data of the manufacturing sector,
and part-time jobs are rare in manufacturing, our
measure of employment in labour years seems to be
a good proxy for the actual number of employed
(CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek 1990). Source: L , CBS,
NA 1969 Ð 1984 and various issues, Table D12.
K: Real value of the capital stock of the manufacturing
sector, interpolated. The nominal capital stock CS
is calculated as
CSt = CSt ± 1 - Dt ± 1 + It ± 1 (B1)
where D is the depreciation and I is the investment
in manufacturing. To yield K, CS is de¯ ated by the
real price of capital, de® ned by de¯ ating the price
index of investment goods (Pinv) by the producers
price index of ® nished products (Py).
Source: CS, CBS, Kapitaalgoederenvoorraad 1989,
1990, 1991. Other values calculated recursively us-
ing (A1);
D, CBS, NA 1969 Ð 1984 and various issues, Table
D10;
I, CBS, NA 1969 Ð 1984 and various issues, Table
D14;
Pinv, OECD, MEI (1980 = 100);
Py , OECD, MEI (1980 = 100).
W : the real wage cost, interpolated. It is de® ned as
W = W I[(1 - W T /44.2) 3 1.3 + W T /44.2]
de¯ ated by Py , where W I is the wage rate in the
manufacturing sector, W T is average working
time. W takes account of the reduction in working
time and allows for an overtime premium of 30%.
Source: W I, CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various
issues;
W T , CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues.
COMP: measure of domestic competitiveness. COMP is
calculated as
COMP = log(e 3 P*/Py)
where e 3 P* is the unit value index of world manu-
facturing exports converted from US dollars to
Dutch guilders relative to the output price index
Py ; e is the spot exchange rate from US dollars to
Dutch guilders.
Source: P*, UN,MBS, various issues, special Table
C or E;
e, OECD, MEI.
W T : world trade measure. W T is de® ned as the resid-
uals of the following regression
log(QW )t = 3.934 + 0.0234t - 0.0003t2 + 2.4E
(224.1) (14.17) ( - 6.631) (6.561)
- 06t3 + seasonals.
QW is the quantity index of exports of all com-
modities from world economies.
Source: QW , UN, MBS, various issues, special
Tables C or E.
AD: adjusted ® scal de® cit, interpolated. AD is de® ned as
in Nickell (1986)
AD = GOV DEF/POTGDP - 0.39
3 [(ICOST GOV DBT /POTGDP)
- 0.02 3 (GOV DEBT /POTGDP)],
where GOV DEF is government de® cit, (ICOST )
GOV DBT is the (interest payment of ) government
debts and POTGDP is the potential GDP, which
we de® ne as
POTGDP = GDP/CAPUT
where GDP is the actual GDP and CAPUT is the
capacity utilization rate.
Source: GOV DEF, CBS, NA, Table R5;
GOV DEBT , CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various
issues;
(ICOST ) GOV DEBT , CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek,
various issues;
GDP, CBS, NA 1969 Ð 1984 and various issues,
Table M3;
CAPUT , OECD, MEI, various issues.
TP: measure of labour augmenting technical progress,
interpolated. TP is computed via
D 1 log At = [D 1 log Y t - n 1 D 1 log L t
- (1 - n 1 ) D 1 logKt]/ n 1
where Y t is the GDP of the industrial sector and
n 1 is the labour income share. The initial value of
the logA is set equal to zero. TP = logA,
smoothed by double exponential smoothing.
Source: Y , CBB, NA, Table M3;
n 1 , CPB, L ange Reeksen.
JJ: job-to-job, rate, de® ned as the number of job-mov-
ers per 100 workers. This series is composed of the
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labour mobility measure, as collected by the CBS,
Arbeidskrachtentelling , for 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981,
1983 and 1985, where the intermediate values were
obtained by interpolation, the number of job-mov-
ers per 100 workers, as collected by the Dutch
Ministry of Social A airs and Employment in
Kwartaalbericht Arbeidsmarkt 1992: 2 for the years
1983 to 1990. This series serves as the basis for the
quit rate that we apply. The years 1972, 1973 and
1974 of JJ are based on a backward extrapolation
of a regression of the yearly job-to-job mobility rate
on lagged job-to-job mobility, the number of unem-
ployed (U ) and vacancies (V ); V is the number of
job vacancies in thousand units, and U is the sea-
sonally adjusted unemployment in 1000 persons.
Quarterly ® gures of JJ were obtained by interpola-
tion, where account is being taken of the fact that
the sum of these quarterly ® gures must equal the
corresponding yearly quit rate. We do not approx-
imate job-to-job movement by the vacancies-unem-
ployment ratio (V -U) (cf. Burgess, 1988) because
since the early 1980s the yearly ® gures of the job-to-
job mobility rate and the corresponding V -U do no
longer resemble; job-to-job movement rose much
steeper than V -U.
Source: V , OECD, MEI; U, OECD, MEI
Fx: number of persons moving from employment to
unemployment and non-participation , where the lat-
ter consists of disability and (early) retirement. Quar-
terly ® res are constructed by interpolation, taking
account of the restriction that the sum of quarterly
® gures equals the corresponding annual ® gure.
Source: Fx, Sociale verzekeringsraad, Kroniek van
de sociale verzekeringen 1992.
Fi : total in¯ ow of new workers, calculated as
F it = D 1 L tott + Fxt where employment is the total
number of workers in 1000 persons in the Nether-
lands. Quarterly in¯ ow is constructed by interpola-
tion in the same way as the out¯ ow.
Source: L tot OECD, L abour Force Statistics.
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